Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
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(31)- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
- Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies
- Global mutations and local mutations have very different effects on evolution, illustrated by mixed strategies of asymmetric binary games
- The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations
- Fixation probabilities of random mutants under frequency dependent selection
- Another approach to mutation and learning games
- Density dependent replicator-mutator models in directed evolution
- Incentive-based fault tolerant control of evolutionary matrix games
- Evolutionary stability is sensitive on the conflict between reproduction and survival: proofs
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at equilibrium
- Redundancy-selection trade-off in phenotype-structured populations
- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
- The joint evolution of cooperation and competition
- Strictly dominated strategies in the replicator-mutator dynamics
- Asymmetric population games and the legacy of Maynard Smith: From evolution to game theory and back?
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
- Mutation-selection models in population genetics and evolutionary game theory
- Selection theorem for systems with inheritance
- Evolutionary stability against multiple mutations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 493155 (Why is no real title available?)
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Reflective evolution under strategic uncertainty
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1416204 (Why is no real title available?)
- The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games
- Some remarks on evolutionary stability in matrix games
- Replicator equations induced by microscopic processes in nonoverlapping population playing bimatrix games
- Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players
- Evolutionary games under incompetence
- Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
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