Asymmetric population games and the legacy of Maynard Smith: From evolution to game theory and back?

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2004.11.003MaRDI QIDQ2565655zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ilan Eshel

Publication date 28 September 2005

Published in Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2004.11.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites work

• Coevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions
• Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Evolutionary stability: One concept, several meanings
• Further remarks on Darwinian selection and altruism
• Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Kin selection and strong evolutionary stability of mutual help
• Models of animal conflict
• Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
• On the dynamics of asymmetric games
• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(4)

• Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated hawk-dove game
• The iterated hawk-dove game revisited: the effect of ownership uncertainty on bourgeois as a pure convention
• Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives
• Bimatrix replicator dynamics with periodic impulses

This page was built for publication: Asymmetric population games and the legacy of Maynard Smith: From evolution to game theory and back?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2565655)