Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
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Publication:1077339
DOI10.1007/BF01769275zbMath0594.90098MaRDI QIDQ1077339
Publication date: 1986
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769275
evolutionary stable strategy; dynamical equilibrium; Evolutionary equilibrium; games between populations
91A05: 2-person games
92D25: Population dynamics (general)
92B05: General biology and biomathematics
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