A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states

DOI10.1007/BF02071058zbMath0802.90139MaRDI QIDQ684773

Eric E. C. van Damme, Immanuel M. Bomze

Publication date: 6 October 1993

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic stabilityreplicator dynamicsNash equilibriummixed strategiespolymorphismsstability in evolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Related Items

An integrated approach to evaluating sustainability in supply chains using evolutionary game theory ⋮ On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests ⋮ Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation ⋮ Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability ⋮ Detecting all evolutionarily stable strategies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary stability: States and strategies
• Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
• Game dynamics, mixed strategies, and gradient systems
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. I. Symmetric contests
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionarily stable strategies depending on population density
• Exponential Families and Game Dynamics
• Strategy stability in complex randomly mating diploid populations
• The Logic of Animal Conflict