An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation

DOI10.1007/s10479-021-04297-5zbMath1505.91074OpenAlexW3203675292MaRDI QIDQ2095939

Giovanni Villani, Marta Biancardi, Gianluca Iannucci

Publication date: 15 November 2022

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04297-5

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamegroundwater extractionillegal behaviors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework ⋮ The environmental responsibility of firms and insurance coverage in an evolutionary game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states
• Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
• On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case

This page was built for publication: An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation