Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
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Publication:5941005
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00047-0zbMath1007.91532OpenAlexW1968399551WikidataQ126644249 ScholiaQ126644249MaRDI QIDQ5941005
Begoña Casino, Santiago J. Rubio
Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00047-0
Related Items (12)
A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation ⋮ Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game ⋮ Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework ⋮ Optimal Allocation of Groundwater Resources: Managing Water Quantity and Quality ⋮ Some reflections on past and future of nonlinear dynamics in economics and finance ⋮ Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource ⋮ Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications ⋮ Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater ⋮ The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games ⋮ Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach ⋮ Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management ⋮ An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
Cites Work
- Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems
- The buffer value of groundwater with stochastic surface water supplies
- Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty
- Uncertainty and irreversibility in groundwater resource management
- The economics of conjunctive groundwater management with stochastic surface supplies
- An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
- Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
- Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
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