Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game
DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00436-0zbMATH Open1498.91289OpenAlexW4213298029MaRDI QIDQ2172102FDOQ2172102
Authors: Marta Biancardi, Gianluca Iannucci, Giovanni Villani 
Publication date: 15 September 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00436-0
Recommendations
- Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
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- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
groundwater managementfeedback solutionleader-follower differential gameunauthorized water extraction
Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)
Cites Work
- Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
- Optimal adaptation strategies to face shocks on groundwater resources
- Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
Cited In (13)
- A differential game for optimal water price management
- Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
- Centralized and decentralized management of groundwater with multiple users
- Optimal harvesting policy for biological resources with uncertain heterogeneity for application in fisheries management
- An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
- Groundwater use under incomplete information
- TOWARD CONTROLLING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION OF GROUNDWATER: A HIERARCHICAL POLICY FORMULATION GAME
- Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework
- Dynamic games in environmental economics and management
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