Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game

DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00436-0zbMATH Open1498.91289OpenAlexW4213298029MaRDI QIDQ2172102FDOQ2172102

Authors Marta Biancardi, Gianluca Iannucci, Giovanni Villani 

Publication date 15 September 2022

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00436-0

zbMATH Keywords

groundwater managementfeedback solutionleader-follower differential gameunauthorized water extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

Recommendations

• Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
• Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
• An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
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• Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource

Cites Work

• Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
• Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
• Optimal adaptation strategies to face shocks on groundwater resources
• Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater

Cited In (13)

• A differential game for optimal water price management
• Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
• Centralized and decentralized management of groundwater with multiple users
• Optimal harvesting policy for biological resources with uncertain heterogeneity for application in fisheries management
• An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
• Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
• The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
• Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
• Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
• Groundwater use under incomplete information
• TOWARD CONTROLLING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION OF GROUNDWATER: A HIERARCHICAL POLICY FORMULATION GAME
• Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework
• Dynamic games in environmental economics and management

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