Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game
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Publication:2172102
Recommendations
- Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
- Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
- An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
Cites Work
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
- Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Optimal adaptation strategies to face shocks on groundwater resources
- Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
Cited In (13)
- A differential game for optimal water price management
- Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
- Centralized and decentralized management of groundwater with multiple users
- Optimal harvesting policy for biological resources with uncertain heterogeneity for application in fisheries management
- An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
- The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
- Groundwater use under incomplete information
- TOWARD CONTROLLING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION OF GROUNDWATER: A HIERARCHICAL POLICY FORMULATION GAME
- Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework
- Dynamic games in environmental economics and management
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