The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
DOI10.1142/S0219198921500237zbMATH Open1489.91060OpenAlexW4200075717MaRDI QIDQ5072232FDOQ5072232
Authors: Alain Jean-Marie, Víctor Bucarey López, Mabel Maria Tidball 
Publication date: 26 April 2022
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500237
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Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Existence theories for optimal control problems involving partial differential equations (49J20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Discrete-time games (91A50)
Cites Work
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- Game-Theoretic Patrolling with Dynamic Execution Uncertainty and a Case Study on a Real Transit System
- A review of dynamic Stackelberg game models
- The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
- Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
- Some Clarifications on the Transversality Condition
- Infinite-Horizon Optimal Control in the Discrete-Time Framework
- Myopic versus far-sighted behaviors in dynamic supply chain coordination through advertising with reference price effect
- Corrigendum to ``Myopic versus farsighted behaviors in a low-Carbon supply chain with reference emission effects
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