The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:5072232)
Recommendations
- A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation
- Centralized and decentralized management of groundwater with multiple users
- Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
- Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game
- Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
- A review of dynamic Stackelberg game models
- Corrigendum to ``Myopic versus farsighted behaviors in a low-Carbon supply chain with reference emission effects
- Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
- Game-theoretic patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty and a case study on a real transit system
- Infinite-horizon optimal control in the discrete-time framework
- Myopic versus far-sighted behaviors in dynamic supply chain coordination through advertising with reference price effect
- Some Clarifications on the Transversality Condition
- The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5072232)
