Game-theoretic patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty and a case study on a real transit system

DOI10.1613/JAIR.4317MaRDI QIDQ4979440zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco M. Delle Fave, Albert Xin Jiang, Zhengyu Yin, Chao Zhang, Milind Tambe, Sarit Kraus, John P. Sullivan

Publication date 23 June 2014

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.4317

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Applications of game theory (91A80) Decentralized systems (93A14) Discrete event control/observation systems (93C65)

Recommendations

• Protecting moving targets with multiple mobile resources
• On dynamic patrolling security games
• Methods and algorithms for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games. (Extended abstract)
• A continuous-time Markov Stackelberg security game approach for reasoning about real patrol strategies
• Tackling sequential attacks in security games

Cited in

(19)

• Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games
• Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design
• Adversarial patrolling with spatially uncertain alarm signals
• A leader-follower partially observed, multiobjective Markov game
• Protecting moving targets with multiple mobile resources
• Methods and algorithms for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games. (Extended abstract)
• Recursive inspection games
• Tackling sequential attacks in security games
• Passivity-based distributed strategies for stochastic Stackelberg security games
• Bilevel `defender-attacker' model with multiple attack scenarios
• A continuous-time Markov Stackelberg security game approach for reasoning about real patrol strategies
• Human-agent decision-making: combining theory and practice
• Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
• The Stackelberg games of water extraction with myopic agents
• Algorithms for a risk-averse Stackelberg game with multiple adversaries
• A review of attacker-defender games: current state and paths forward
• Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games
• Stationary Stackelberg equilibrium in two-person zero-sum stochastic Stackelberg games
• Defending a city from multi-drone attacks: a sequential Stackelberg security games approach

This page was built for publication: Game-theoretic patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty and a case study on a real transit system

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4979440)