A continuous-time Markov Stackelberg security game approach for reasoning about real patrol strategies

DOI10.1080/00207179.2017.1371853zbMath1418.91119OpenAlexW2747851981MaRDI QIDQ4561198

Julio B. Clempner

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: International Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207179.2017.1371853

zbMATH Keywords

continuous-time random walkcontinuous-time Markov gamespatrollingStackelberg security games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sums of independent random variables; random walks (60G50) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (5)

Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games ⋮ Proximal constrained optimization approach with time penalization ⋮ Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games ⋮ Handling a Kullback--Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games ⋮ Multi-robot adversarial patrolling strategies via lattice paths

Uses Software

• IRIS

Cites Work

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• Game-Theoretic Patrolling with Dynamic Execution Uncertainty and a Case Study on a Real Transit System

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