Cited in
(15)- Modeling and mitigating link-flooding distributed denial-of-service attacks via learning in Stackelberg games
- Two-stage invest-defend game: balancing strategic and operational decisions
- Human-agent decision-making: combining theory and practice
- Optimal duty rostering for toll enforcement inspectors
- Patrol scheduling in urban rail network
- Open-loop Stackelberg learning solution for hierarchical control problems
- Adversarial patrolling with spatially uncertain alarm signals
- Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment
- Allocating limited resources to protect a massive number of targets using a game theoretic model
- A leader-follower partially observed, multiobjective Markov game
- On Stackelberg mixed strategies
- Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games
- A continuous-time Markov Stackelberg security game approach for reasoning about real patrol strategies
- A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems
- Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
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