Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games

DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2017.12.004zbMath1394.91079OpenAlexW2782802862WikidataQ115041718 ScholiaQ115041718MaRDI QIDQ1747487

Kristal K. Trejo, Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak

Publication date: 8 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2017.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningStackelberg gamessecurity gamesmultiple playersbehavioral gamesstrong Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games ⋮ Handling a Kullback--Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games

Uses Software

• IRIS

Cites Work

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• Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
• Reinforcement learning agents
• Using the extraproximal method for computing the shortest-path mixed Lyapunov equilibrium in Stackelberg security games
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• An optimal strong equilibrium solution for cooperative multi-leader-follower Stackelberg Markov chains games
• A continuous-time Markov Stackelberg security game approach for reasoning about real patrol strategies
• Game-Theoretic Patrolling with Dynamic Execution Uncertainty and a Case Study on a Real Transit System
• Recent advances in hierarchical reinforcement learning

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