Computing the strong L_p-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
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Publication:2284447
DOI10.1016/J.APM.2016.09.001zbMATH Open1443.91041OpenAlexW2520006692WikidataQ56606039 ScholiaQ56606039MaRDI QIDQ2284447FDOQ2284447
Authors: Kristal K. Trejo, Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak 
Publication date: 15 January 2020
Published in: Applied Mathematical Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apm.2016.09.001
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Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)
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Cited In (14)
- Handling a Kullback--Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games
- Finding the strong Nash equilibrium: computation, existence and characterization for Markov games
- Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games
- Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games
- Optimal level of transfer pricing for profit sharing: a Lagrange regularized game theory approach
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- Dr. Alexander Semionovich Poznyak Gorbatch: biography
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- Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
- Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
- A Tikhonov regularized penalty function approach for solving polylinear programming problems
- A proximal/gradient approach for computing the Nash equilibrium in controllable Markov games
- Proximal constrained optimization approach with time penalization
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