Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
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Publication:1664280
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2015.06.005zbMath1410.91046OpenAlexW823755433MaRDI QIDQ1664280
Alexander S. Poznyak, Julio B. Clempner
Publication date: 24 August 2018
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.06.005
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