Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
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Publication:1664280
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2015.06.005zbMATH Open1410.91046OpenAlexW823755433MaRDI QIDQ1664280FDOQ1664280
Authors: Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak 
Publication date: 24 August 2018
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.06.005
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Cited In (13)
- Finding the strong Nash equilibrium: computation, existence and characterization for Markov games
- A Tikhonov regularization parameter approach for solving Lagrange constrained optimization problems
- Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games
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- Dr. Alexander Semionovich Poznyak Gorbatch: biography
- Necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for multiobjective Markov chains optimality
- Computing a mechanism for a Bayesian and partially observable Markov approach
- Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
- Negotiating transfer pricing using the Nash bargaining solution
- Interval methods for computing strong Nash equilibria of continuous games
- A proximal/gradient approach for computing the Nash equilibrium in controllable Markov games
- Regularization and approximation methods in Stackelberg games and bilevel optimization
- Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
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