A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00079-4zbMath1081.91002MaRDI QIDQ1415908

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 9 December 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Implementation; Mechanism design; Consumption externalities; Distributive Lindahl equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations, Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness

Cites Work

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