Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
DOI10.1007/S001990050276zbMATH Open0952.91045OpenAlexW2046078612MaRDI QIDQ1293747FDOQ1293747
Authors: Guoqiang Tian 
Publication date: 15 January 2001
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050276
Recommendations
- Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
- Nash implementation in production economies
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
- Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
Nash equilibriadouble implementationLindahl allocationsWalrasian allocationsprivate goods production economiespublic goods production economiesunknown production technologies
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Public goods (91B18)
Cited In (17)
- Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
- Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
- Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
- Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
This page was built for publication: Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1293747)
