Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer (Q1293747)

The aim of this paper is to present two feasible and continuous mechanisms which doubly implement Walrasian allocations for private goods production economies, and Lindahl allocations for public goods production economies in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. There are allowed preferences, initial endowments, production technologies and coalition patterns to be unknown to the designer. The proposed mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for a two-agent world, thus providing a unified mechanism treatment that is irrespective of the number of agents. Furthermore, the obtained implementation result holds on a large domain of economic environments, including some non-neoclassical economic environments. Preferences of agents are allowed to be non-total-nontransitive, and discontinuous for the implementation of the Walrasian allocations. The proposed mechanisms may also be seen as types of ``market games'', thus being similar to the Walras or Lindahl rules: the strategies of the mechanisms are ``prices'' and ``quantities'' and agents' consumption is chosen from their budget sets. This natural interpretation of the mechanism design provides at least a partial response to the large area of the implementation mechanisms that are highly unrealistic and impossible for a real player to use.