Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
This paper deals with the implementation of allocation rules in production economics with possibly unequal labor skills among individuals. The authors study axiomatic characterizations of Pareto subsolutions which are implementable by sharing mechanisms in Nash, strong Nash, and subgame perfect equilibria. The sharing mechanism allows the agents to work freely and distributes the produced output to the agents, according to the profile of labor hours and the information on demands, prices, and labor skills. Based on the characterizations, they find that most fair allocation rules, which embody the ethical principles of responsibility and compensation, cannot be implemented when individuals' labor skills are private information.
- Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
- Fair allocations in large economies with unequal production skills
- Nash implementation in production economies
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills.
- Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
- Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Objective measures of well-being and the cooperative production problem
- The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
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