Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2384716
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0072-7zbMath1130.91012MaRDI QIDQ2384716
Publication date: 10 October 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0072-7
91A12: Cooperative games
91B42: Consumer behavior, demand theory
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
Related Items
On Non-Welfarist Social Ordering Functions, Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
- Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
- Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Objective measures of well-being and the cooperative production problem
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills.
- Nash implementation in production economies
- The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Toward Natural Implementation
