Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2321zbMath0892.90010OpenAlexW1995427383MaRDI QIDQ1381986

Sungwhee Shin, Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date: 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2321

zbMATH Keywords

commons problemdesirable game forms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills ⋮ Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case ⋮ Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Networks of common property resources ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization

Cites Work

• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
• A characterization of the Walras rule
• The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
• Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology: Comparison of Three Solutions
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Toward Natural Implementation