Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
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Publication:1381986
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2321zbMATH Open0892.90010OpenAlexW1995427383MaRDI QIDQ1381986FDOQ1381986
Authors: Sungwhee Shin, Sang-Chul Suh 
Publication date: 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2321
Recommendations
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- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Satisfying and optimality in \(2\times 2\) common interest games
- An extension of duality to a game-theoretic framework
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Dual representation of cooperative games based on fenchel-moreau conjugation
Cites Work
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- A characterization of the Walras rule
- The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
- Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology: Comparison of Three Solutions
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
Cited In (7)
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Implementation theory
- Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
- Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Networks of common property resources
- Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods
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