A characterization of the Walras rule
From MaRDI portal
DOI10.1007/BF00186278zbMATH Open0847.90009MaRDI QIDQ1908524FDOQ1908524
Sang-Chul Suh, Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa
Publication date: 28 February 1996
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cited In (16)
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Local strict envy-freeness in large economies
- Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Walrasian social choice in a large economy
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Non-bossiness
- Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
- Cooperative production: A comparison of lower and upper bounds
- On decomposable exchange rules
- Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills
- Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions
- Horizontal equity and stability when the number of agents is variable in the fair division problem
Recommendations
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule 👍 👎
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences 👍 👎
- Walrasian social choice in a large economy 👍 👎
- A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice 👍 👎
- Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies 👍 👎
This page was built for publication: A characterization of the Walras rule
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1908524)
