Walrasian social choice in a large economy

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(92)90007-RzbMATH Open0760.90005OpenAlexW2090171697MaRDI QIDQ1197634FDOQ1197634

Authors: Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa 

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(92)90007-r

Recommendations

• A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice
• Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
• A characterization of the Walras rule
• An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces
• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule

zbMATH Keywords

weak monotonicityWalrasian allocationsnon-discriminationcore propertyinfinite agentssocial choice axioms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Walrasian social choice in a large economy
• A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice

Cited In (8)

• A characterization of the Walras rule
• Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies
• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
• Walrasian social choice in a large economy
• Social choice in economic environments
• Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
• Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments
• On the existence of Walrasian equilibrium in large-square economies

This page was built for publication: Walrasian social choice in a large economy

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1197634)