Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00038-9zbMATH Open0930.91010OpenAlexW2128971283WikidataQ127628704 ScholiaQ127628704MaRDI QIDQ1296450FDOQ1296450

Authors: José M. Córdoba, Peter J. Hammond 

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00038-9

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designstrategy-proofnesscontinuum of agentsnon-Walrasian mechanismssmooth exchange economiessmooth random exchange economiesWalrasian mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited In (14)

• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies
• Walrasian social choice in a large economy
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
• Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
• Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium

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