Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
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Publication:514479
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0970-7zbMath1405.91358OpenAlexW2294974798WikidataQ59615556 ScholiaQ59615556MaRDI QIDQ514479
Publication date: 2 March 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0970-7
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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