Manipulation via Endowments
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Publication:4197579
DOI10.2307/2297049zbMath0409.90014OpenAlexW2070037214MaRDI QIDQ4197579
Publication date: 1979
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297049
General Equilibrium TheoryExchange EconomyConsumer BehaviorManipulationIndividually Rational And Pareto Optimal AllocationsPre-TradeReallocation Mechanism
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