Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
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Publication:2432489
Recommendations
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- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
Cites work
- A note on the incentive compatible core
- Bayesian Implementation
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
- Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
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