Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0107-1zbMATH Open1158.91313OpenAlexW2075873822MaRDI QIDQ2432489FDOQ2432489

Authors: Françoise Forges 

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/166

Recommendations

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• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
• A note on the incentive compatible core

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