Bayesian Implementation
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Publication:3971630
DOI10.2307/2938265zbMATH Open0735.90002OpenAlexW4242867364MaRDI QIDQ3971630FDOQ3971630
Authors: Matthew O. Jackson 
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938265
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Cited In (83)
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Information in Tullock contests
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Implementation theory
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Implementation with evidence
- The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Quantum Bayesian implementation
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- Interactive implementation
- Implementation with partial provability
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Rationalizable implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- On the implementation of the median
- Price suppression stimulation in a local market
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Minimum cost connection networks: truth-telling and implementation
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
- Common-value group contests with asymmetric information
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- On the robustness of Laissez-Faire
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Repeated implementation
- Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Implementation under ambiguity
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
- Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Weak implementation
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
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