Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
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Publication:1926969
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.023zbMath1253.91033MaRDI QIDQ1926969
Mich Tvede, Jens Leth Hougaard
Publication date: 29 December 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.023
Nash equilibrium; Shapley value; incomplete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; minimum cost spanning tree; truth-telling
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