Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00039-0zbMath0927.91012MaRDI QIDQ1296451

H. Peyton Young

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cost allocationpublic facilitiesextended core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ NON‐LINEAR PRICING AS A COOPERATIVE GAME ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

Cites Work

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• A simple noncooperative core story
• Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• A market to implement the core
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints a l'equilibre budgetaire
• Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation
• Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure

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