USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500041zbMath1260.91010MaRDI QIDQ3144195

Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez

Publication date: 7 December 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

aspiration core; nonempty core extension; strategic coalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Autonomous coalitions, Multicoalitional solutions, Supermodular NTU-games

Cites Work

• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
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• Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game
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• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
• Multilateral bargaining problems
• The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME