USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3144195
DOI10.1142/S0219198912500041zbMath1260.91010MaRDI QIDQ3144195
Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez
Publication date: 7 December 2012
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
Multicoalitional solutions ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Supermodular NTU-games ⋮ Autonomous coalitions
Cites Work
- Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
- Bargaining in cooperative games
- Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
- Multilateral bargaining problems
- The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
- The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
- Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME
This page was built for publication: USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION