The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
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Publication:1835854
DOI10.1007/BF01756101zbMath0504.90093MaRDI QIDQ1835854
Publication date: 1983
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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