Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
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Publication:2355013
Recommendations
- USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
- PARTITIONING GAMES WITH RESTRICTED COOPERATION
- Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games
- The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
- The equal split-off set for NTU-games
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
- Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
- The core-partition of a hedonic game
- THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS
- Partial cooperation and convex sets
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3677614 (Why is no real title available?)
- A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Axiomatizing core extensions
- Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games
- Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games
- Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation
- Cores of partitioning games
- Nonempty core-type solutions over balanced coalitions in TU-games
- PARTITIONING GAMES WITH RESTRICTED COOPERATION
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
- The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
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