The epsilon core of a large replica game

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Publication:1054642

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90005-8zbMath0518.90101OpenAlexW2167536350MaRDI QIDQ1054642

Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90005-8




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