Large games: Fair and stable outcomes

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90103-7zbMath0617.90100OpenAlexW2025366993MaRDI QIDQ1088926

William R. Zame, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/1811

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value\(\epsilon \)-corelarge games with sidepayments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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