Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
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Publication:1059540
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90063-XzbMath0566.90015OpenAlexW1531463875MaRDI QIDQ1059540
Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90063-x
Related Items (6)
Large games: Fair and stable outcomes ⋮ Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals ⋮ Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
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