Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978457 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A Tiebout theorem
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- The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
Cited in
(20)- Power at general equilibrium
- Endogenous formation of security exchanges
- Groups, collective decisions and markets
- Share equilibrium in local public good economies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4123478 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining cum voice
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3891051 (Why is no real title available?)
- Externality effects in the formation of societies
- Finite decentralization in a Tiebout economy with crowding types
- Market games and clubs
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Club theory and household formation
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
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- Household formation and markets
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- Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public bad economies
- A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy
- Local public good equilibrium
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