Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core
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Publication:2365071
DOI10.1007/BF01213446zbMATH Open0876.90028MaRDI QIDQ2365071FDOQ2365071
Authors: Myrna Wooders
Publication date: 4 February 1997
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities
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Cited In (20)
- Finite decentralization in a Tiebout economy with crowding types
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public bad economies
- Share equilibrium in local public good economies
- Household formation and markets
- Endogenous formation of security exchanges
- A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy
- Power at general equilibrium
- Club theory and household formation
- Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bargaining cum voice
- Groups, collective decisions and markets
- Externality effects in the formation of societies
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
- Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
- Local public good equilibrium
- On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
- Market games and clubs
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