Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2486163
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.05.001zbMath1114.91038OpenAlexW2038309384MaRDI QIDQ2486163
Robert P. Gilles, Thijs Ten Raa
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.05.001
Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Convergence theorems on the core of a public goods economy: Sufficient conditions
- Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
- Core equivalence with congested public goods
- Efficient Exchange with a Variable Number of Consumers
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
- The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy