The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
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Publication:4331910
DOI10.2307/2527314zbMath0867.90020OpenAlexW1991242700MaRDI QIDQ4331910
Dimitrios Diamantaras, Robert P. Gilles
Publication date: 13 February 1997
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7438467d207ec5aba26b407c506869ff14beecdd
Related Items (12)
The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour ⋮ The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities ⋮ Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods ⋮ Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods ⋮ Coalitional economies with public projects ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects ⋮ Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
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