Coalitional economies with public projects

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0038-2zbMATH Open1132.91429OpenAlexW2023349119MaRDI QIDQ2500708FDOQ2500708

Authors: Achille Basile, Anna De Simone, Maria Gabriella Graziano 

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0038-2

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• Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects
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• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
• Coasian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The core-Walras equivalence
• Edgeworth's conjecture in economies with a continuum of agents and commodities
• Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
• On the Edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive economies with restricted coalitions
• The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities
• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• Markets with many more agents than commodities Aumann's ``hidden assumption
• Finitely Additive Nonatomic Coalition Production Economies: Core-Walras Equivalence
• Existence of nonatomic core-Walras allocations
• Finitely Additive Correspondences

Cited In (7)

• Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
• Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
• Core equivalence theorem: countably many types of agents and commodities in \(L^1(\mu)\)
• Economic juries and public project provision
• Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
• Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
• Two characterizations of cost share equilibria

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