Coalitional economies with public projects

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0038-2MaRDI QIDQ2500708zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Achille Basile, Anna De Simone, Maria Gabriella Graziano

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0038-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
• Coasian equilibrium

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3816010 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3576139 (Why is no real title available?)
• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Edgeworth's conjecture in economies with a continuum of agents and commodities
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Existence of nonatomic core-Walras allocations
• Finitely Additive Correspondences
• Finitely Additive Nonatomic Coalition Production Economies: Core-Walras Equivalence
• Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
• Markets with many more agents than commodities Aumann's ``hidden assumption
• On the Edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive economies with restricted coalitions
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• The core-Walras equivalence
• The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities

Cited in

(7)

• Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
• Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
• Core equivalence theorem: countably many types of agents and commodities in \(L^1(\mu)\)
• Economic juries and public project provision
• Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
• Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
• Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods

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