Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6080457
DOI10.3934/jdg.2023002zbMath1522.91123OpenAlexW4366317373MaRDI QIDQ6080457
Maria Romaniello, Maria Gabriella Graziano, Marialaura Pesce
Publication date: 2 October 2023
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023002
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
- Equivalence of the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a finite coalition production economy
- Bargaining sets in finite economies
- Edgeworth equilibria, fuzzy core, and equilibria of a production economy without ordered preferences
- The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour
- Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition
- On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core
- Walrasian analysis via two-player games
- Large economies and two-player games
- Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
- Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
- Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
- A fuzzy core equivalence theorem
- A limit result on bargaining sets
- Market games and Walrasian equilibria
- Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets
- A strategic market game approach for the private provision of public goods
- Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
- Coalitional economies with public projects
- Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
- OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- Mathematical methods of game and economic theory
- Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the "Scandinavian Consensus" Approaches
- The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
- Some equivalence results for a bargaining set in finite economies
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
This page was built for publication: Two characterizations of cost share equilibria