Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0529-7MaRDI QIDQ431806zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maria Gabriella Graziano, Maria Romaniello

Publication date 3 July 2012

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0529-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
• The equivalence of the cost share equilibria and the core of a voting game in a public goods economy
• On the theory of cost sharing
• The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
• Two characterizations of cost share equilibria

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488113 (Why is no real title available?)
• A fuzzy core equivalence theorem
• Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
• Coalitional economies with public projects
• Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition
• Core equivalence with congested public goods
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Edgeworth equilibria, fuzzy core, and equilibria of a production economy without ordered preferences
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the "Scandinavian Consensus" Approaches
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
• Probability measures of fuzzy events
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
• The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities
• Walrasian analysis via two-player games

Cited in

(9)

• The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour
• The veto mechanism revisited
• Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
• A proximal point-type method for multicriteria optimization
• Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
• Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods
• The equivalence of the cost share equilibria and the core of a voting game in a public goods economy
• Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
• Inexact proximal point methods for multiobjective quasiconvex minimization on Hadamard manifolds

This page was built for publication: Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q431806)