Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
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Publication:431806
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0529-7zbMath1243.91034MaRDI QIDQ431806
Maria Gabriella Graziano, Maria Romaniello
Publication date: 3 July 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0529-7
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