On the theory of cost sharing

DOI10.1007/BF01227503zbMath0723.90012MaRDI QIDQ2276858

Hans Wiesmeth, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

\(\phi \) -cost sharing equilibriaefficient \(\phi \) -allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good

Cites Work

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• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Distributive justice in taxation
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Remarks on the game-theoretic analysis of a simple distribution of surplus problem
• How to share the cost of a public good
• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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