OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS
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Publication:2812309
DOI10.1111/iere.12165zbMath1404.91095OpenAlexW2344006545MaRDI QIDQ2812309
Maria Gabriella Graziano, Achille Basile, Marialaura Pesce
Publication date: 16 June 2016
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12165
Related Items (7)
The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour ⋮ Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods ⋮ Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Absence of envy among ``neighbors can be enough ⋮ Fairness and formation rules of coalitions ⋮ Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets
Cites Work
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- Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
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- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big
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