Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0854-7zbMath1367.91117OpenAlexW2049318735MaRDI QIDQ324339

Maria Romaniello, Maria Gabriella Graziano

Publication date: 11 October 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0854-7

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscontribution measurespublic projectssophisticated stable setsvon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules

Cites Work

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