Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
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Publication:490208
DOI10.1007/S10479-013-1439-8zbMATH Open1308.91063OpenAlexW2073329208MaRDI QIDQ490208FDOQ490208
Authors: Dezső Bednay 
Publication date: 22 January 2015
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1322/1/Bednay_OneSellerAssignment.pdf
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Cites Work
Cited In (10)
- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
- On games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
- Efron's coins and the linial arrangement
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
- The minimum set of \(\mu\)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game
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