Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules
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Publication:889255
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0892-9zbMath1367.91116OpenAlexW1791478244MaRDI QIDQ889255
Publication date: 6 November 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0892-9
Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (5)
Coalitional fairness with participation rates ⋮ Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies
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