Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules
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Publication:889255
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0892-9zbMATH Open1367.91116OpenAlexW1791478244MaRDI QIDQ889255FDOQ889255
Publication date: 6 November 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0892-9
Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Integrals of set-valued functions
- Large economies with differential information and without free disposal
- Value allocation under ambiguity
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- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
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- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information
- Coalitional Fairness of Allocations in Pure Exchange Economies
- The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies
- A note on the private core and coalitional fairness under asymmetric information
- Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information
- The core of economies with asymmetric information
- Aggregate preferred correspondence and the existence of a maximin REE
- Information and size of coalitions
- Market games with asymmetric information: the core
- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information
- On Vind's theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities
- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core
Cited In (6)
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies
- Coalitional fairness with participation rates
- Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies
- Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets
- Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
Recommendations
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
- Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies π π
- Coalitional fairness and distortion of utilities π π
- A note on the private core and coalitional fairness under asymmetric information π π
- Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies π π
- Coalitional fairness with participation rates π π
- The fairest core in cooperative games with transferable utilities π π
- Fairness and fuzzy coalitions π π
- Fair sharing in cooperative games π π
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