Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
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Publication:898665
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.08.004zbMATH Open1368.91130OpenAlexW2143026550MaRDI QIDQ898665FDOQ898665
Authors: Wei He, Nicholas C. Yannelis 
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1307.pdf
Recommendations
core-Walras equivalencemaximin expected utilitymaximin coremaximin expectations equilibriummaximin incentive compatibility
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Cited In (16)
- Ambiguity and price competition
- A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
- Ambiguity, uncertainty aversion and equilibrium welfare
- Ambiguity sensitive preferences in Ellsberg frameworks
- Generic non-existence of general equilibrium with EUU preferences under extreme ambiguity
- Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- General economic equilibrium with financial markets and retainability
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- On endogenous formation of price expectations
- Equilibrium misperceptions
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences
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