Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.008zbMath1417.91159MaRDI QIDQ1622382

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Luciano I. de Castro

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; ambiguity aversion; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; second-best; first-best

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

91B08: Individual preferences

Related Items

Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence, Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion, Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium, Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies, Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design, Ambiguous implementation: the partition model, Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents, On stochastic independence under ambiguity, Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules, Equilibrium theory under ambiguity, Robust bilateral trade with discrete types, An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies, On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Maxmin implementation, Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions, Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences, Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver, Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium, Incentive compatibility under ambiguity, Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity, Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price, A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility, Dissolving a partnership securely, Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility, Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets, Obvious manipulations, Ambiguity and price competition, Ambiguity sensitive preferences in Ellsberg frameworks, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces, Value allocation under ambiguity, Equilibria and incentives in private information economies, Public goods with ambiguity in large economies, How to make ambiguous strategies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Uncertainty averse preferences
• Ambiguity aversion and trade
• Subjective expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
• Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities
• Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
• Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
• Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
• Decision making under ignorance with implications for social choice
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
• On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
• A theory of rational choice under ignorance
• General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
• min, max, and sum
• Knightian decision theory. I.
• Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• Irrelevance of private information in two-period economies with more goods than states of nature
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
• Subjective Beliefs and ex ante Trade
• Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
• Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine
• Coping with ignorance: Unforeseen contingencies and non-additive uncertainty