Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.008zbMath1417.91159OpenAlexW2791503549WikidataQ130185596 ScholiaQ130185596MaRDI QIDQ1622382

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Luciano I. de Castro

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationambiguity aversionmechanism designincentive compatibilitysecond-bestfirst-best

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (33)

On stochastic independence under ambiguity ⋮ Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price ⋮ A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility ⋮ Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ How to make ambiguous strategies ⋮ Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules ⋮ Public goods with ambiguity in large economies ⋮ Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents ⋮ Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets ⋮ Robust bilateral trade with discrete types ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ Obvious manipulations ⋮ An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies ⋮ Ambiguity and price competition ⋮ Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Ambiguity sensitive preferences in Ellsberg frameworks ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Value allocation under ambiguity

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