Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
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Publication:345200
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0932-5zbMath1367.91113OpenAlexW2226655586MaRDI QIDQ345200
Publication date: 1 December 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0932-5
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (14)
Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility ⋮ Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity ⋮ Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ On endogenous formation of price expectations ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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