Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
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Publication:345200
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0932-5zbMATH Open1367.91113OpenAlexW2226655586MaRDI QIDQ345200FDOQ345200
Authors: Zhi-Wei Liu 
Publication date: 1 December 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0932-5
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Social choice (91B14) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
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- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
- A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
- Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- An extensive form interpretation of the private core
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
Cited In (18)
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Relief maximization and rationality
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- On endogenous formation of price expectations
- A note on the implementation of rational expectations equilibria
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
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