An extensive form interpretation of the private core

DOI10.1007/PL00004189zbMath0989.91065OpenAlexW4244079639MaRDI QIDQ5953032

Allan Muir, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Dionysius Glycopantis

Publication date: 14 January 2002

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004189

zbMATH Keywords

contractscoalitional Bayesian incentive compatibilitydifferential information economygauge treeNash Programmeperfect Bayesian equilibriumprivate coreweak fine core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (15)

Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Private information, transferable utility, and the core ⋮ Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies ⋮ Restricted Coalition Formation ⋮ Private information: Similarity as compatibility ⋮ Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength? ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Continuity properties of the private core ⋮ Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength? ⋮ On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information

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