An extensive form interpretation of the private core
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Publication:5953032
DOI10.1007/PL00004189zbMATH Open0989.91065OpenAlexW4244079639MaRDI QIDQ5953032FDOQ5953032
Authors: Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, Nicholas C. Yannelis 
Publication date: 14 January 2002
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004189
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contractsdifferential information economyprivate coreperfect Bayesian equilibriumcoalitional Bayesian incentive compatibilityNash Programmeweak fine coregauge tree
Cited In (19)
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?
- Private information, transferable utility, and the core
- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core
- Private information: Similarity as compatibility
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- An extensive form interpretation of the private core
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Signaling, screening, and core stability
- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Continuity properties of the private core
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Restricted Coalition Formation
- An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
- Cooperative extensions of the Bayesian game
- On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
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