Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity

DOI10.1007/S40505-021-00206-YzbMATH Open1497.91169OpenAlexW3198443844MaRDI QIDQ2157293FDOQ2157293

Authors Zhi-Wei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date 27 July 2022

Published in Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00206-y

zbMATH Keywords

implementationWald's maxmin preferencesmixed strategy deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3061365 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
• Randomization and ambiguity aversion
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Weak implementation

Cited in

(7)

• Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
• On the normative status of mixed strategies
• Strategic Vagueness, and Appropriate Contexts
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1940467 (Why is no real title available?)
• How to make ambiguous strategies

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