Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity

DOI10.1007/s40505-021-00206-yzbMath1497.91169OpenAlexW3198443844MaRDI QIDQ2157293

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhi-Wei Liu

Publication date: 27 July 2022

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00206-y

zbMATH Keywords

implementationWald's maxmin preferencesmixed strategy deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Weak implementation
• Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core

This page was built for publication: Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity