Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity

DOI10.1007/S40505-021-00206-YzbMATH Open1497.91169OpenAlexW3198443844MaRDI QIDQ2157293FDOQ2157293

Authors: Zhi-Wei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis 

Publication date: 27 July 2022

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00206-y

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationWald's maxmin preferencesmixed strategy deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Weak implementation

Cited In (5)

• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Strategic Vagueness, and Appropriate Contexts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
• How to make ambiguous strategies

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